Consolations of the law: jurisprudence and the constitution

of deliberative politics by Fitzpatrick, Peter
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 
research output of Birkbeck College 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
 
 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (2001). Consolations of the Law: 
Jurisprudence and the Constitution of Deliberative 
Politics. Ratio Juris 14 (3) pp. 281–297.
 
 
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in Ratio Juris (ISSN 
0952-1917). This version has been peer-reviewed but does not include the 
final publisher proof corrections, published layout or pagination. 
 
 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual 
property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should 
comply with the relevant law. © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001. The definitive 
version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com 
 
 
 
Citation for this version: 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (2001). Consolations of the Law: Jurisprudence and the 
Constitution of Deliberative Politics. London: Birkbeck ePrints. Available at: 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/archive/00000482
 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
Fitzpatrick, Peter (2001). Consolations of the Law: Jurisprudence and the 
Constitution of Deliberative Politics. Ratio Juris 14 (3) pp. 281–297. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk
 
Consolations of the Law: Jurisprudence and the Constitution of 
Deliberative Politics 
PETER FITZPATRICK 
 
Initially, deliberative politics offers a failure of self-
identity in that the literature dealing with it divides 
between its determinate elevation in terms of reason, and 
such, and its dissipation in response to the diversity of 
interests pressing on it. Next, drawing on the resources of 
poststructural jurisprudence and by way of locating law at 
a defining limit of deliberative politics, a similar divide is 
found in law itself. Then, more productively, law is shown 
to be constituted with-in that divide and to take 
characteristic content from it. Finally, the analysis is 
returned to deliberative politics where the divide found in 
the literature can now be seen as offering this politics 
possibilities of effective constitution and distinctive 
content. 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a sharp and intriguing division in the literature on deliberative 
politics, a division which informs my whole argument here. This is not 
an immediately propitious opening since the division, in its 
persistence, would seem to be fundamental, even insuperable. Essays 
are, after all, meant to achieve some resolution. Yet it will be 
resolution itself, its necessity yet impossibility, which will preoccupy 
me here - and especially the resolution which is said to come from 
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deliberative politics or from decisions supposedly reached by 
deliberation. 
I will, however, be exploring the irresolution of resolution not just 
in deliberative politics but also, and mainly, in relation to law. Law 
marks and compensates for the limits of deliberative politics, and 
perhaps by looking through law at the limits of deliberative politics we 
may discern what is within those limits and learn something of what 
deliberative politics “is.” The consideration of what such a politics 
positively or singularly “is” returns me to the divide in the literature on 
deliberative politics since my concern with that divide is not, or is not 
only, a concern which would negatively deconstruct that literature but, 
rather, one which would seek to identify a dynamic with-in the divide 
constituent of deliberative politics itself.  
To bring this over-allusive synopsis within range, let me now begin 
to identify this divide in the literature. I will do so with instances taken 
from the recent collection edited by Jon Elster on Deliberative 
Democracy (Elster ed. 1998). For ease of frequent reference, I will call 
the two sides of the divide the sanguine and the sceptical. The 
sanguine, as it would have to be, is the predominant view and it can be 
illustrated in Elster’s “Introduction” (Elster 1998). Here we find that 
“deliberative democracy” is “decision making by discussion among 
free and equal citizens” (Elster 1998, 1). The main patron saint 
invoked is Habermas with his idea of “the ideal speech situation,” 
although some place is given to Rawls and his paradoxical ability to be 
situationally deracinated. There are also, in the liberal tradition, 
invocations of reasonableness, the spirit of compromise and abstracted 
proceduralism. In this kind of company, it seems possible to present 
deliberative politics as something uncoerced, impartial, rational, and 
wholistic. Like other invocations of the quasi-transcendent in 
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modernity, this one is endowed with content negatively. Deliberative 
argument is set against the crudities of “aggregation” - that is, of 
deciding by the votes of people not connected in deliberation. And its 
supposed attributes of encompassing impartiality and calm reason 
stand opposite force, rhetoric, interest, faction, “bias and distortion” 
(Elster 1998, 13). 
Deliberative politics does, however, have a quiddity more palpable 
than the assertion that it is not something else. It exists, for example, in 
time and as definite action. So, Elster recognizes that “time always 
matters,” and that “political deliberation is constrained by the need to 
make a decision” (Elster 1998, 6, 9 - his emphasis). He contrasts this 
to the scientific realm in which “scientists can wait for decades and 
science can wait for centuries” (Elster 1998, 9). The implication here 
of an attainable and “undistorted” scientific truth, to say nothing of its 
leisurely unfolding, is engagingly antique. But there is more going on 
here. The invocation of science in this way posits a perfectible truth  
which deliberative politics simply has a little more difficulty in 
attaining. So, when Elster comes, in his own substantive chapter, to 
consider particular histories of constitution making, he has inevitably 
to put more emphasis on the derogations from perfectible truth - on the 
price to be paid for the existent decision and for the putatively 
resolved.1 There is now a seeming inevitability to the distortion of 
both - a dissipating “internal heterogeneity,” a varying “interplay of 
reason, interest, and passion,” more a nomadic truth (Elster 1998, 14, 
105; cf. Blanchot 1993, 125).2 The vocabulary of evaluation changes. 
                                                          
1 It seems to be aptly impossible for even a sympathetic, but acute, instantiation of deliberative 
politics to avoid the recognition of its incompleteness (cf. e.g., Hilson 2000, 79-83, 98-9). 
 
2 ``External'' heterogeneity can, however, provide a protective dissipation. For example: ``A 
more fully democratic polity would be one in which the aspirations, interests, values, and 
beliefs of all citizens could be asserted fully, in all their richness and variety, in many different 
kinds of processes of deliberation and decision [_]'' (Cotterrell 1994, 34). Engaging as such 
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There is now a more evanescent world where the attributes of 
deliberative politics are “more” or “less likely” to be present; they 
operate as part of a “continuum” along with their defining opposites, 
and so on (e.g. Elster 1998, 109-10). 
There is a redemptive Habermasian legacy which could come into 
play here, but which Elster makes nothing of except for its passing 
mention, and that is the notion of the ideal, as in Habermas’s “ideal 
speech situation” for example.3 In such a situation we cannot discern 
an ultimate truth and endow it with any specific content. Nor can we 
ever certainly know what is properly rational, impartial and uncoerced. 
Yet the search for truth, the efficacy of reason, and so on, all operate 
still as impelling ideals. They may be unattainable but they can 
somehow still have an always anticipatory operation in the here and 
now. They act as if an autonomous impartiality were possible, as if 
everything relevant could be brought to bear on the decision - could be 
“taken into account.” All of which places Habermas in the tradition of 
an anomalous but convenient liberal political philosophy where an 
ideal which simply cannot be can nonetheless have a potent and 
pervasive existential purchase.4
The sceptical side of the divide would dissipate but not destroy the 
sanguine.5 There are in Elster’s collection two strong instances of the 
                                                                                                                                         
advocacy is in other ways, pockets of privileged power could nonetheless nestle happily in such 
a promiscuity of ``deliberation and decision.'' Constitutional Law could be called on to provide 
some surpassing accountability but now it also is not immune to the blandishment of 
deliberative politics (cf. Morison 1998). 
 
3  For a compact statement of Habermas's thought on this and a scrupulous critique, see Pettit 
1982. 
 
4 Dworkin's Law's Empire is a stark and ardent example of the influence of perfection on 
deliberation: see Dworkin 1986. 
 
5 There are other grounds for scepticism besides those extracted here. For example, the 
generalized resolution often associated with deliberative politics is not entirely remote from the 
participatory claims once made for nation: see Renan 1990. 
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sceptical. These are provided by Stokes (1998) and Johnson (1998). 
Stokes presents us with “pathologies of deliberation.” A pathology 
affirms a healthy norm, of course, but it is difficult to see how the 
labyrinthine stratagems Stokes so graphically describes do not simply 
put the resulting decisions beyond the range of any effective 
deliberative politics. Again and again she instances the overriding or 
destruction of “deliberative democracy” by interest. Interest shapes or 
creates power over information and its communication in the process 
of ostensible deliberation. It disseminates information quite contrary to 
the real situation, generates deceptive “pseudo-preferences” among 
people supposedly in deliberation, and generally seeks to manipulate 
both them and the issues involved. It even creates powerful 
participants in the process, - by “manufacturing pseudo-grassroots 
movements,” for example - so as to orient deliberation and outcomes 
in its own terms (Stokes 1998, 133). What is even more outrageous, 
however, is that all this is done in terms of deliberative democracy 
itself when the whole exercise has been nothing but a mockery of it. 
Still, Stokes ends her compelling account of the nemesis of 
deliberative politics with a sustaining faith not only in its existence but 
also in “some of the good effects theorists attribute to it” (Stokes 1998, 
136). 
Even though they do have a considerable cumulative impact, Stokes 
does no “more than offer some instances of public communication 
with pathological results,” whereas Johnson’s chapter, my second 
sceptical instance, is more analytically elaborated (Stokes 1998, 125; 
Johnson 1998). The main “message” of this chapter would accord with 
Stokes in seeing deliberative politics as an infinitely manipulable 
carrier of interest. Johnson argues cogently that there cannot be an 
unlimited plurality of participants in deliberation. As against the view 
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that an “unrestricted domain” is necessary for deliberation, Johnson 
not only suggests that this is impossible but finds that in fact 
“advocates of deliberation regularly … impose substantial prior 
constraints either on the behavior of parties to deliberation or on the 
range of views admissible to relevant deliberative arenas” - a 
restriction which such apologists justify “by reference to some 
standard of reasonable behaviour or discussion” (Johnson 1998, 164-
5). In deliberative politics, as seen by Johnson, the politics and 
political disagreement are primary and persistent. Indicatively, this is a 
politics incapable of consensual resolution when, as will often be the 
case, parties seek to undermine each other’s “worldview” (Johnson 
1998, 167). Indeed, if we add Stokes’s examples to Johnson’s analysis, 
we may conclude that deliberative politics so-called would elevate and 
comprehensively assert a particular worldview as a generalized 
consensus (cf. Hilson 2000, 79-80 n.56). Johnson also makes several 
telling points of detail, such as his observation that deliberation is 
oriented towards conformity as well as or rather than consensus. Or 
there is his intimation “that the outcome of deliberation depends 
heavily upon the sequence in which participants speak and the point at 
which debate is terminated” (Johnson 1998, 176). Instances of the 
inscrutability of deliberation could doubtless have been multiplied. 
Still, Johnson would support deliberative politics. Not only does he 
find it “intuitively appealing” but he ends by detailing the 
“challenges…deliberation must meet” if it is to be more truly itself 
(Johnson 1998, 173, 177). 
Given the insistence of deliberation in the face of these significant 
onslaughts, we may return with some sympathy to the sanguine side of 
the divide, and I will now do so but still accompanied by Johnson’s 
sceptical arguments, taking firstly the idea of the “unrestricted 
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domain” as necessary for deliberation. True, any restriction will 
detract from the perfection of deliberation, yet there has to be some 
restriction of participants and issues and, further, some commonality 
between them for deliberation to be. Deliberation can neither extend to 
everybody nor fully accommodate an unlimited diversity of issues. 
Looked at another way, there has to be a restricted domain, and not an 
infinite dissipation, if people are to relate at all. The restriction needed 
to make deliberation work will inevitably mean that deliberation 
cannot be a force-free field. Interest is also inextricable from the 
impelling focus of each participant. But the mere assertion of one 
particular interest is itself incompatible with relation to another 
assertion of interest. What is more, the solitary assertion of interest is a 
futility. Relation and assertion require a responsiveness in and between 
those who affirm differing interests. Interest and relation are, in short, 
inextricable.  
Johnson does raise a compromise formula put forward by advocates 
of deliberative politics which is particularly pertinent here. This is the 
notion of “reasonable pluralism” as it nestles in the argument “that 
public deliberation need not be responsive to ‘the fact of pluralism’ per 
se but only to ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’” (Johnson 1998, 168). 
Johnson then patiently presents the counter-argument that this formula, 
in situating pluralism in the name of the reasonable, accommodates the 
surpassing assertion of particular criteria of relevance or 
“reasonableness.” There is, admittedly, a tinge of the oxymoron to 
“reasonable pluralism” but, again, we may have some sympathy with 
its sanguine assertion. With an operative pluralism - a pluralism where 
the parties are in relation - there can be neither complete separation 
between them nor their complete fusion in terms of surpassing criteria. 
It is the very separation involved in a plurality combined with relation 
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which demands that the parties have some-thing in common, 
something shared. Being reasonable - adjudging things as more or less, 
weighing and balancing contrary imperatives - thence becomes apt. 
Let me now try to take matters further by returning to my opening 
prospectus and considering what deliberative politics may be in the 
light of its limit. Contrary to Elster’s equating deliberative democracy 
with “decision making by discussion,” no amount of discussion or 
deliberation produces the decision. The decision and, in Johnson’s 
terms, its “legitimating, binding” quality is always something more 
(Elster 1998, 1; Johnson 1998, 177). I will now explore what that more 
may be and how it refracts on the nature of deliberative politics.  
 
The proximity of law 
The “legitimate, binding” form of what is always more than 
deliberation, the form of the decision which has to supervene if 
deliberation is to be any more than interminably unresolved - that form 
is the law. The law is at the limit of deliberation not just in a way 
which is simply disjoint or apart, not just as a marking of what is 
beyond deliberation, not just negatively or differently, but also as the 
contiguous limit of deliberation. As deliberation’s own limit the law 
touches it and shares its ambivalence. Law, in short, compensates or 
consoles for the irresolution of deliberation, whilst affirming in its own 
matching irresolution the failure of “all effort of consolation” (cf. 
Levinas 1991, 20).  
I will try to indicate generally what this resort to law entails or 
suggests for deliberative politics. The apparent conflicts in deliberative 
politics, or in accounts of such politics, are reflected in law and legal 
decision, and this happens not in a way which resolves matters by 
elevating one side in conflict over another or by subsuming both in 
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some tertium quid. Rather, each side of the conflict retains its 
distinctness whilst being oriented towards the other in a mutually 
constituent relation. I have already intimated how this is so for 
deliberative politics in the introductory analysis of some of the 
literature on it. Perhaps the general approach there could be 
distinguished in a preliminary way by contrasting it to more 
monadically robust approaches. One approach, itself long associated 
with law,  would elevate the determinative power of reason in 
complete and constant opposition to reason’s ruin or deformation in 
the passions, force, and such. Another approach would see the 
elevation of reason in writings such as Elster’s as quaintly pre-
Freudian. That is, critical social theorists and others have shown 
abundantly that reason is an expression of passion, force or interest, 
and that reason has in its own terms at best a tenuous existence as their 
mask and legitimation. 
For a more elaborated bringing of law into proximity with 
deliberative politics now, I will begin with the rule of law and a 
chasmic division within it - a division of enormous significance but 
rarely remarked, van de Kerchove and Ost providing an important 
exception (1994). The predominant view of the rule of law drapes it in 
a secular solidity. Countless histories and juridical affirmations would 
have us believe that the rule of law is characterized by certainty, 
predictability, and order. As against the vagaries of an arbitrary and 
discretionary power, the rule of law clearly marked out an area of 
calculability in which the individual could now purposively progress. 
In order for this law, and “not men,” to rule, it had to be coherent, 
closed and complete. If it were not coherent but contradictory, 
something else could be called on to resolve the contradiction. If it 
were open rather than closed, then something else could enter in and 
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rule along with law. If it were incomplete and not a whole corpus 
juris, and if it were thence related to something else, then that 
something else could itself rule or share in ruling with law. For all of 
which, law had to be self-generating and self-regulating because if it 
were dependent upon something apart from itself for these things, 
then, again, those things would rule along with or instead of law.  
We can, however, take each of these imperative qualities of the rule 
of law and evoke their opposite “in” the rule of law itself. For law to 
rule, it has to be able to do anything, if not everything. It cannot, then, 
simply secure stability and predictability but also has to do the 
opposite: it has to ensure that law is ever responsive to change, 
otherwise law will eventually cease to rule the situation which has 
changed around it. So, how could the rule of law be complete if it must 
ever respond to the infinite variety of fact and circumstance impinging 
on it? How could it be closed when it must hold itself constantly 
responsive to all that is beyond what it may at any moment be? And 
how could law, in extending to what is continually other to itself, 
avoid pervasive contradiction? Law cannot be purely fixed and pre-
existent if it is to change and adapt to society, as it is so often said that 
it must. Its determinations cannot be entirely specific, clear and 
conclusive if it has integrally or at the same time to exceed all 
determination, to assume a quality of “everywhereness” (Carty 1991, 
196). And every tale of law’s bringing order to disordered times and 
places in the triumph of modernity or capitalist social relations, and 
such, can be matched by others where it created uncertainty and 
inflicted massive disorder in the same cause.  
We can also see modern law similarly stretched between stable 
determination and responsive change in the persistent squabbles that 
so enliven jurisprudential thought. These intractably polarized debates 
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alternate between law’s being autonomous and its being dependent. 
Taking the latter first, it is readily said that law is dependent on 
society, politics, the popular spirit, scientistic administration, the 
economy, and so on. More recent variants would have law taking 
identity from the discourses or narratives in which it is embedded. In  
a more diachronic vein, we are told incessantly that law has to change 
along with society or history, otherwise it becomes increasingly 
irrelevant and eventually obsolete. The contrary claims for autonomy, 
although a little more venerable, have not lost any of the force of their 
assertion. With them law somehow has to stand apart from the 
remorseless demands of society, history, and so on, and even to 
exclude its “own history” (Derrida 1992b, 190; 1994, 194). In being so 
placed, “absolute and detached from any origin,” law not only stands 
distinctly apart from, say, society, but also orders, shapes, or even 
creates society - to adopt long-enduring and standard formulations (see 
Kelley 1984, 42-5; Lieberman 1989, 281; and for the quotation see 
Derrida 1992b, 194). To the extent that society does not so conform, 
law yet retains its hold as the measure against which that “failure” and 
passing imperfection are to be measured. In this, and indeed in all the 
various applications and changes throughout its history, a law remains 
insistently that law. Law’s autonomous binding force cannot be 
contained by what it is or has been, by its history, but extends to all 
that it will be. Law is eternally present. 
Yet for all the enduring dissension, this seemingly chasmic division 
between conceptions of law erupts within the solitary pursuit of what 
law may be, in the search for its resolved or resolving unity. When 
some entity is always attended with opposed perceptions of it, the 
tempting resolution is to say that these perceptions point to different 
aspects of that same entity. This is certainly done with law but, more 
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typically, dissension continues but with some mutual and more or less 
marginal recognition as between the two dimensions of autonomy and 
dependence. Nowadays, even the most resolute proponents of 
dependency would accord law some distinctiveness even if they 
would, in turn, seek to explain that very distinctness in, say, social or 
economic terms. None would argue, however, that the text of the law 
could be changed simply as an effect of that dependency. And of late, 
even the most ardent legal positivists would not say that their posited 
law can remain in a settled stasis but must, rather, give way, and give a 
way, to what is beyond it. That is, law must provide a way for what is 
other to it to enter the never complete or enclosed, always fungible 
boundary marked out by its own determinative assertion. An easy 
solution often adopted in both camps is to say that law is, discretely, 
autonomous and dependent. In this light, part of any law will be 
enduringly secure but in other respects the law will be uncertain and 
subject to change. The poverty of this expedient can be summarily 
seen in the failure to distinguish between the domains of autonomy 
and dependence in law, either generally or in any particular instance of 
it. 
Perhaps then the enquiry should be diverted. Rather than seeking 
law in that which simply conforms to either side or both sides of the 
opposition, perhaps we could seek a law which “is” in-between the 
opposed dimensions, which “is” the experienced combination of them, 
and which has its being because each dimension is inexorable yet 
unable to be experienced by itself. And perhaps these dimensions are 
equivalent to the divide between law’s autonomy and law’s 
dependence. If so, then it would seem that the condition of being in 
law is always unresolved and calling for incessant decision and 
judgement. Nonetheless, we may find prospects for resolution in these 
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dimensions being not only opposed but somehow integral to each 
other. Clearly, completeness of position and responsiveness to what is 
beyond position are antithetical things. Yet there can be neither 
position without responsiveness to what is always beyond it nor 
responsiveness without a position from which to respond. 
So, even though law has to assume an effective position it must also 
be incipiently ever beyond position. It could be said that law must 
attach to a reality but it cannot be fully identified with or lost in that 
reality if it is to integrally evoke and prehensively orient what is ever 
beyond that reality. Law is, to borrow Cain’s pointed phrase, 
“necessarily out of touch” (Cain 1976, 226). Law, that is, must take on 
a quasi-transcendence and stand apart from the profane, yet if it 
becomes too “out of touch” with society it ceases to be effective. I will 
now try to convey something of law’s subsisting in-between these two 
prerequisite demands by looking at a much discussed text of Derrida’s. 
 
The exigencies of law. 
That text is his “Force of Law” (Derrida 1992a). The legal act - say, a 
legal decision - somewhat paradoxically entails a “dissociating 
….from activity” in its integral extraversion towards the other (Derrida 
1997, 14). And that extraversion is elicited in “Force of Law” as 
justice. Derrida would want to “make explicit or perhaps produce a 
difficult and unstable distinction between justice and droit, between 
justice (infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to 
symmetry …) and the exercise of justice as law or right, legitimacy or 
legality, … calculable, a system of regulated and coded prescriptions” 
(Derrida 1992a, 22). 
For Derrida we come to law via justice. Justice imports an unlimited 
responsiveness to the other. The very singularity or specific finiteness 
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of the other calls for an infinite regard. But the illimitable demand of 
justice without more, or without less, is impossible and even 
inexpressible, always beyond attainment and ever “to come” (Derrida 
1992a, 27). To be effective, to be made possible, justice must be given 
operative force and for this it must, in a sense, be denied. The limitless 
expanse of justice, that is, must be “cut” into, reduced and rendered 
expressible. An obvious contradiction now emerges: justice can only 
be made just in a way that is unjust. 
Law, or more precisely the legal decision, is that which cuts into and 
assures justice (and less than justice). In this, “law is the element of 
calculation” (Derrida 1992a, 16). It imports a stability and regularity. 
If codifies, prescribes and determines. It lends its intrinsic force and 
enforceability to justice. It cannot, however, be accounted for in terms 
of justice. And justice, in any case, is unlimiting and cannot account 
for anything. So, Derrida frequently contrasts justice and the just 
decision with the legal decision which “simply consists of applying the 
law,” or in which “the judge is a calculating machine,” or in which 
“we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, to a correct 
subsumed example, according to a determinate judgement” (Derrida 
1992a, 16, 23). Yet, despite Derrida’s assertion that these things 
“happen” - an assertion which, as we will now see, is untenable in 
terms of his own argument - he also recognises that matters are more 
mixed, that law is not “simply” to be distinguished from justice but 
must integrally be more (Derrida 1992a, 22-3).6
                                                          
6 Some careful readers of the argument which follows claim that it does not accurately portray 
Derrida's idea of law. For Derrida, so it is said, law is the element of calculation or 
determination, and so on. Doubtless Derrida does identify law with such things but, in my 
understanding, he is also making justice intrinsic to law. Where Derrida seems to be saying that 
calculation and application can ``happen'' by themselves, I have to confess to being simply 
puzzled. My grateful engagement with Derrida here is an abbreviated version of Fitzpatrick 
2001, 73-9. 
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Law may be necessary for the enforcement of justice, but that justice 
which lies ever beyond determination is also necessary for the 
enforcement of law. A living law, to borrow the phrase, is not 
containable in some terminal stasis but is incipiently and ever oriented 
beyond what it may at any moment be. There is then, “an ordeal of the 
undecidable” which is not only anterior to but also inhabits and 
persists in and beyond the legal decision: “the undecidable remains 
caught, lodged, at least as a ghost - but an essential ghost - in every 
decision, in every event of decision”; and, “each case is other, each 
decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, 
which no existing coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely” 
(Derrida 1992a, 23, 24). The persistently undecidable in law, its 
constant “inadequation”, opens law to justice or, put another way, the 
undecidable brings justice into law (Derrida 1992a, 20). In all, the act 
of legal decision combines law as the calculable with justice as the 
incalculable response to the “absolutely unique” beyond determined 
calculation, exchange or reciprocity. Justice, in its turn, is effected 
through law as calculable. Each is necessary for the operation of the 
other yet each is necessarily distinct from the other. There is a relation 
of “difference and … co-implication” between them (Derrida 1994, 
177). 
“In” this relation “justice exceeds law and calculation” but law is 
also seen by Derrida as “exceeding” justice (Derrida 1992a, 28). We 
must, Derrida emphasises, calculate and we must negotiate “the 
relation between the calculable and the incalculable”: “this 
requirement does not properly belong either to justice or law. It only 
belongs to either of these two domains by exceeding one in the 
direction of the other” (Derrida 1992a, 28). Law, then, as calculation 
can only “properly belong” to itself, by exceeding itself “in the 
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direction of” justice (Derrida 1992a, 28). Calculation, in short, goes to 
as well as against justice. Or inversely, as we have already seen, 
justice is operatively integral to law, to the legal decision. The 
question of how just is the decision, of how far it goes “in the direction 
of” justice, is another matter. Law orients the decision in a relation to 
justice, in an “inclination” towards the other (cf. Nancy 1991, 3-4). 
Neither illimitable justice nor law - law which is not beholden to 
anything “before” it - can be contained in some notion of the just as 
ideal or as the Good. Justice always sits “very close to the bad, even to 
the worst for it can always be re-appropriated by the most perverse 
calculation” (Derrida 1992a, 28). 
As to the “other” side of the equation, justice exceeding itself in the 
direction of law, we have also seen that, to have effect, justice depends 
on law: “incalculable justice requires us to calculate” (Derrida 1992a, 
28 - his emphasis). If “I” am to be in a relation to the other, to say 
nothing of relating to a diversity of others, then justice must be 
delimited in the act of legal decision. Without a limit, there can be no 
relation to the other. Giving my-self to the other in the unalloyed 
demand of justice is inherently unachievable. It could never form or 
resolve into a relation. Or, in a more apocalyptic vein, once the giving 
were achieved, there would be a simultaneous dissolution of the very 
“I” which was to relate to the other.  
Law, in summary, becomes the combination of determination with 
what is ever beyond determination. It cannot be simply or solely the 
principle of calculation, that which cuts into and renders the 
responsiveness of justice operative. Justice, responsiveness, 
responsibility - responsability to adopt an archaic usage - also renders 
law operative. The legal decision must: 
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… be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law 
and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each 
case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new 
and free confirmation of its principle. (Derrida 1992a, 23) 
 
Again, “no existing, coded rule can … guarantee absolutely” what will 
be decided (Derrida 1992a, 23). And what has been decided, judicially 
or legislatively, cannot stand apart in a determined or determining 
isolation. The decision cannot “be” in the world if it seeks merely to 
affirm or be affirmed in itself - if it has no connection, no relation to 
anything else. To maintain its “place” it must ever go beyond its own 
bounds and relate to all circumstance and possibility that would come 
to or be brought to it (Derrida 1977; 1992a, 38). Hence, law or the 
legal decision has constantly to destroy itself to stay itself. It has 
always to decompose in order to be composed. There is always 
something “rotten” in law (Derrida 1992a, 39). 
Such a responsiveness “in” law can never, then, be satisfied in terms 
of what can be cognitively brought to bear. No decision could ever 
“furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge 
of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it” 
(Derrida 1992a, 26). Inversely, a determination based on knowledge 
cannot ever be complete in some final isolated resolution. Even if it 
could, we, being “within” knowledge, could never know it to be 
complete. Something could always come from beyond, something 
“more,” and reveal our over-confident conclusion to be not so. We 
could begin to grasp that “more” in its relation to law by looking at it 
negatively. If determination were adequate or complete, there would 
be no place or call for decision or for judgement. Alternatively, there 
will always “in” the legal act be something beyond any particular or 
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possible determination. There will always and at every moment (that 
is, at every point of impinging difference) be a demand for “fresh 
judgement” (Derrida 1992a, 26). It is in the very absence of 
determination, or in the presence of irresolution, that there is a demand 
for law and for legal judgement. The responsibility, or the 
responsability (again the archaic use), involved in judgement and the 
decision cannot be accommodated within the determined or the 
known. There is always “in” it a “secret,” a mystery, a “madness” 
(Derrida 1992a, 26; 1995, 65). 
 
The violence of law 
This accounting for law’s force can be made more pointed in that 
quality of “violence” which Derrida deems necessary for legal action – 
more pointed in that violence can return our focus to deliberative 
politics since violence could be taken as encapsulating that which is 
said to stand opposed to the integrity of deliberation as reasonable: 
surpassing force, the assertion of interest, and so on. Writing of the 
“terrifying … violence that founds,” the violence of revolutionary 
origin, Derrida remarks that it “appears savage” in its unrestrained 
illegality, but he makes the point so as to show that this is a violence 
indistinguishable from the ordinary operation of the law (Derrida 
1992a, 35, 40). “Violence is not exterior to the order of droit. It 
threatens it from within”; and so we must “recognize meaning in a 
violence that is not an accident arriving from outside law” (Derrida 
1992a, 34-5). The “meaning” of this violence subsists in what is ever 
“undecidable” in law itself. With the act of legal decision, no pre-
existing rule or dictate can determine its outcome. There is always a 
“madness” in the moment of decision. And, it could be added, with 
law’s whole existential orientation, there is always an in-dwelling 
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responsiveness and “undecidability” in the face of what lies beyond 
and constantly challenges law’s determinations. So, this violence 
“threatens the entire judicial order itself,” yet “that which threatens 
law already belongs to it” (Derrida 1992a, 33, 35).  
To refine that somewhat precipitate introduction of violence and to 
bring it to bear on deliberation, I should try to clarify the concept of 
violence adopted here. The usual conception of violence is quite 
literally conservative. What is being conserved is the irenic condition 
which violence destroys from without. That condition is one of a given 
“world” of shared values, shared language, the restful domain of 
reason and pacific order, ever complete in itself. With this numbed 
normality, violence can only be justified in the maintenance or 
restoration of the concordant world. And in occidental myth, this 
justified violence is the preserve of law. Law thence, as it is so often 
put, has the monopoly of violence and, along with that endowment, 
violence outside of law becomes transgressive and illegitimate. In this, 
law is not simply confined to some supporting role, however. It has, 
somehow, to be both violent and intrinsically associated with non-
violence. It is pervasively placed in the ordered world and operatively 
integral to it. Yet law’s  violence must be co-extensive and more than 
co-extensive with this ordering. The violence and the incipient 
violence of law must constantly support the ordered world in and 
beyond its full range, support it against the violent and disintegrating  
forces of disorder within or hovering ever beyond that range. In its 
quality of expectant and responsive violence, law must extend further 
than and encompass the world it sustains. Law, in its turn, must 
forever chase and mark itself against a transgressive violence beyond - 
“the outside into which…[law] is always receding” (Foucault 1987, 
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34). Yet this transgressive violence in its turn emanates from and is in 
thrall to that determined norm which is the law. 
There is, then, in the violence of law a contrary combination of 
determining force and responsive expectancy. How may this 
dichotomy be overcome? Put another way, how may the dissipation of 
responsiveness be contained so as to secure the palpably determinant? 
The usual occidental mode of doing this is to compromise each of 
these two elements by cross-cutting them in a delimiting 
generalization about violence itself and its contained, determinant 
being. The standard expedient is the rendering of violence as the 
painful infliction of physical force. Where may this marking apart, this 
cutting classification of violence come from, if not itself from an 
arbitrary violence? The answer is usually a naturalist assumption about 
pain’s being observable as distinctly physical, supplemented by the 
“naturally” easy observation of physical force being inflicted. Such 
simple meaning now has its rivals. A standard story of the West 
connects a decline in “physical” violence with the progress of its 
civilization, but revisionist histories would typify such civilization as 
itself a tentacular violence, not just in its suppression and exclusion of 
others who do not accord with its norms, but also in the deeply 
disciplinary application of those norms to those who do conform (e.g. 
Foucault 1979). Violence, in this refinement, is often given content by 
another variety of naturalist assumption, no longer now an ascription 
positively corresponding to the violence but, rather, the assumption of 
a primal entity negatively opposing it. Foucault’s occasional espousing 
of “the body” and “the pleb” would provide instances (e.g. Foucault 
1981, 96). 
Another, and more thoroughly radical departure from the 
conventional view of violence would reject a putative resolution in 
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naturalist terms and accommodate the dichotomy between 
responsiveness and determination located in the violence of law. This 
entails “a more embracing structure of violence which refuses the 
logic of opposition” between violence and non-violence (Beardsworth 
1996, 21). This “more embracing structure” can be intimated and 
illustrated in Blanchot’s disturbing aperçu on torture:  
 
Torture is the recourse to violence - always in the form of a technique 
- with a view to making speak. This violence, perfected or 
camouflaged by technique, wants one to speak, wants speech. Which 
speech? Not the speech of violence - unspeaking, false through and 
through, logically the only one it can hope to obtain - but a true 
speech, free and pure of all violence. This contradiction offends us, but 
also unsettles us. Because in the equality it establishes, and in the 
contact it reestablishes between violence and speech, it revives and 
provokes the terrible violence that is the silent intimacy of all speaking 
words… . (Blanchot 1993, 42-3) 
 
This relation between torture and language indicates that in 
deliberation there can be no placid normality apart from violence. 
There cannot, that is, be an “expelling of the violence of Being” 
(Levinas 1996, 11). There is always something, something “other,” 
infinitely disrupting what is, as it were, within - what is seemingly 
known and what is held to. Violence, therefore, cannot be denied a 
priori and excluded from some detached and placid domain. 
More pointedly, deliberation, for example, cannot rest secure in 
some soi-disant completeness, cannot be “fully self-
present…immediate and transparant” (Derrida 1976, 119). It cannot 
subsist in an “impossible purity” whence a violence from without 
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“would come to pounce upon it as a fatal accident” (Derrida 1976, 
110, 135). Or, rather, in its operative assertion as complete, 
deliberation cannot be just that. It can only endure in a continuing 
relation to what is necessarily and constantly denied, suppressed or 
adapted to make it complete. Put in a other perspective, deliberation 
cannot exist and endure in a solitary stasis. The distinctive affirmations 
of its putative integrity, of its still reason for instance, are themselves 
indistinguishable from the myriad of decisions needed “to deal with” 
what-ever would impinge upon it. This dealing-with involves and 
invokes, in the very violence of its exclusions and assimilations, a 
responsiveness to what-ever would impinge, a responsiveness that is 
quite other to the violence of decisive assertion, a responsiveness 
which is non-violent. This responsiveness, in turn, cannot effectively 
be without the violent assertion of position, a position from which it 
may depart and a position to which it may return. So, violence and 
non-violence are each necessary for the operative existence of the 
other. To be so, each must also be different from the other - there is 
something after all to the logic of “opposition” (Beardsworth 1996, 
21).  
There is point, then, to both the standard story of law’s intrinsic 
opposition to violence as well as to those not-unusual revisionist 
claims that law itself is violent. In its stable, determined state law is 
and must be against any violence which would disrupt such a 
condition. Yet, it  goes on, law’s determined state itself results from 
the violent, decisional “cutting” into that justice which insistently 
comes from beyond it. And, it still goes on, to sustain its putative 
determination, law must be non-violently responsive. That is, it must 
accommodate, give way to and give a way to, what comes from 
beyond it. At the same time, that justice which demands 
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accommodation, the active alterity beyond, cannot simply be placid 
and expectant. It must have some bearing on, some complicitious 
connection with the violence of decision bringing it into law. 
There is an irresolution to decision also, as we saw, and the 
constituent inadequacy of the decision does not merely afflict its initial 
making but must extend to its continued assertion. There has to be, 
that is, a constant remaking of the decision as it encounters situations 
which are inevitably new. To stay “the same” the decision must alter 
in its relation to what is ever different. In its sustained existence, then, 
the decision cannot endure as a settled stasis but must enable what is 
other to it to enter repeatedly the never complete or enclosed, and 
always fungible boundary marked out by its own determinative 
assertion. The seeming paradox, then, is that the decision is 
continually “conserved” and “destroyed”; it has to be, again, 
“regulated and without regulation” (Derrida 1992a, 23). It is in this 
absence of finality that there is the expectation of an unending law 
which ever seeks and ever fails to overcome the irresolution. 
 
Deliberation 
The companiate parallels between law and deliberation are not yet 
fully drawn. Deliberative politics in its sanguine solidity may match 
law’s determinative assertion, and the dissipation of uncontainable 
interests perceived by the sceptics may match law’s indeterminate 
responsiveness. Yet there are also ways of being in-between these two 
ultimate conditions. And there have to be. Each condition is 
existentially unsustainable in itself. To identify such a way of being 
pertinent to deliberative politics, I will persist a little longer with the 
oblique approach through law as the limit of deliberative politics, 
taking now law’s generality as a mode of thus being in-between. Law 
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seeks some constant identity in its generality. As general, law would 
apply to persons or situations in “the abstract” or “universally” and so 
much so, some would add, that a decision (ostensibly) confined to the 
particular does not count as law (e.g. Rousseau 1968, 82; Locke 1965, 
409 - para. 142). Yet, as we have seen, the legal decision “applying” a 
rule cannot simply and deductively do that. No pre-existent rule can 
determine a decision made “under” it. The decision, with its 
ineliminable specificity or particularity, always demands “fresh” 
judgment (e.g. Derrida 1995, 65). So, in responding to the specific and 
always unique case presented to it, the decision reaches beyond what 
is already set and given. Through engaging with what cannot be pre-
set and contained, the decision is oriented towards the universal. In its 
generality, then, the legal rule accommodates this dimension. The 
general rule “applied” in the decision cannot be reduced to the sum of 
its determined applications. It extends in an ever incipient 
responsiveness towards all its future possible applications. But in so 
doing, it cannot be completely and self-destructively responsive. The 
rule, to be a rule, cannot simply and potentially apply to everything but 
must be expectantly applicable in an orientation towards something of 
the determinedly particular. It marks out its own ground. The 
“general” is, in short, an occupying of the space in-between the 
responsive and the determined “in” law, a space conceived now as in-
between law’s orientations towards the universal and towards the 
particular. 
Returning to the literature of deliberative politics, reason could be 
seen as occupying the same space in-between in accounts or 
legitimations of such politics. Reason was, as we saw, readily adduced 
in sanguine accounts. And it was just as readily rejected in sceptical 
objections. These went on to reveal reason’s dissipation in interest. 
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But even the sceptics were not prepared to regard deliberation itself as 
so debased that it could serve merely as the carrier or mask of interest. 
Apart from advocating its redemption, however, the sceptics did not 
endow deliberative politics with a content substituting for reason. 
However, along with law, there may be consolations to be had in 
another form of prescription - in meaning. To deliberate, using Skeat’s 
synopsis, is to carefully weigh and consider (Skeat 1963, 134). 
Without extracting all the etymological detail, the term imports a 
weighing and balancing. It evokes or is inclined towards resolution 
without asserting resolution explicitly or finally. The etymology would 
also demand that in this weighing or balancing there be consultation, 
something ever inclined beyond any ready resolution. But not only so 
inclined. Deliberation is deliberate.  
A similar trajectory can be followed “with reason.” Here we could 
perhaps bring together two sets of meaning distinguished by Williams 
(1988, 253-4). We have encountered one set when looking at the 
optimistic notion of “reasonable pluralism” in the literature of 
deliberative politics. In this setting, being reason-able involved a 
weighing or balancing, evoking that “reasonable [which] developed a 
very early specialized sense of moderation or limitation” (Williams 
1988, 253 - his emphasis). The other set of meaning may be more 
immediately difficult. Here reason can be both a transcendent mode of 
thought or argument and a determinate specificity as in “[having] a 
reason for believing” something (Williams 1988, 253 - his emphasis). 
Obviously, I am suggesting that in an operative way the two seemingly 
distinct sets of meaning can be combined in the same dimensions as 
those found in the analyses of law and deliberative politics. 
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Deliberative politics would nonetheless remain insistently 
unresolved. Our very starting point was that such a politics cannot be 
encompassed by some determined or determining quasi-transcendence 
- by the ideal, by reason, by an elevating commonality. Yet neither can 
it be accommodated in responsiveness to a dissipation of particular 
interests. What is constituent of a deliberative politics is the space in-
between these two impossible dimensions and the way in which that 
space is occupied. 
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